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Summary 
In this note we discuss the PUM, which is a demand system consisting of 
polynomials in income of degree N with coefficients being functions of 
prices. In particular, we derive the general forms of these coefficients 
for arbitrary value of N, when the system should display utility 
maximization under a budget restriction. 
1. Introduction 
If a polynomial demand system can be written as: 
(1.1) qk(p,y) = ckQ(p) + ckl(p)y + ck2(p)y2 + ... + ckN (p)yN 
with k=l,...,K, 
where qk = quantity consumed of commodity k, 
pk = price of k, 
p = vector of all prices px,...,pK and 
y = "income" to be allocated to goods 1,...,K, 
and the ckn(p) are functions of prices such that the conditions of addi-
tivity, homogeneity and utility maximization are satisfied, we call it a 
PUM system (Polynomial demand system based on Utility Maximization). 
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Additivity requires 
(1.2) l pkqk - y. 
k-l 
For homogeneity the coefficients ckn(p) should be homogeneous of degree -
n for all n — 0,1,...,N and all k. Utility maximization requires that the 
K*(N+1) matrix C(p)-'[ckn (p) ] is such that the Slutsky matrix S=[skm] 
with skm-<3qk/3pm+qm .3qk/3y is symmetrie and negative semi-definite. Below 
we will show the implications of the conditions of additivity, 
homogeneity and symmetry for the functions ckn(p). The implications of 
the negative semi-definitiveness are not analyzed here. 
Our line of reasoning is as follows: 
First, we prove that for all n,r - 2,...,N the ratio a n r = c k n (p)/ck (p) is 
independent of k. This means that the last N-l columns of C(p) are 
proportional, given p. Hence C(p) has a rank that is at most 3. This 
strong result is derived by Gorman [1981] in a more general context. For 
our special case (1.1) a much simpler proof is available. 
Second, we simplify (1.1) in assuming, that all functions ck0 are zero. 
For this simplified system we shall derive the implications of the 
symmetry condition for functions ckn. The K*N matrix of coefficients of 
the simplified system will be called C*(p). 
Third, noticing that the matrix C*(p) contains at most two independent 
columns, the first, called c1(p), and, say, the last one, called cN(p), 
we provide a lemma (lemma 2) which gives us the specifications of these 
two columns. 
Fourth, we specify the remaining columns of C*(p), i.e. we specify the 
factors of proportionality anN between each of these columns and cN(p). 
Fifth, we return to the system (1.1). 
In the next section we state the above-mentioned lemma, preceded by lemma 
1 that helps to simplify our presentation. In section 3 we present our 
result; we end with a short discussion in section 4. 
2. Two lemmas 
In analyzing Slutsky symmetry lemma 1 appears to be useful. 
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Lemma 1. (Inverse Young theorem.) If fx,...f K are functions of the 
vector p=(px , •. . .pK) with continuous first derivatives such that for each 
function ffc with k=l,...,K and for all vectors p from a certain domain D 
and for all k,m — 1,...,K. 
aPm 3Pk 
then there exists a function F of p1 , . . . ,pK such that for all p 6 D and 
all k - 1 K 
Proof: see Van Daal and Merkies [1984, pp 137-139]. 
The announced second lemma is: 
Lemma 2. The demand system 
(2.3) qk - <pk(p)y + ^(p)/ 1 
with h = 2,3,..., is compatible with utility maximization if and only if 
the <pk and the ->f> are such that (2.3) can be written as: 
/0 ,, 1 da. _,_ 1 3H h 
( 2
-
4 ) q
^
 = i 5 p 7 y + ^ ^ y • 
where a(>0) and H are functions of prices that are homogeneous of degree 
1 and 0 respectively and, furthermore, a and H are such that the corre-
sponding cost of utility function 
1 
(2.5) c(p,u) - a(£H-u)£ , 
with s = 1-h, is concave. 
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For ease of exposition we omitted the arguments p of the functions a and 
H, just as we will do below for the functions cpk and Vk • Note that, 
because of the budget restriction, the case that all functions <pk are 
zero cannot occur; this means that the function a cannot be a constant. 
Proof: The Slutsky element skm of (2.3) is a polynomial in y of the form 
(2.6) o^y - / ^ y * +
 7km y2*'1, 
it is symmetrie in k and m if symmetry holds for all three coefficients. 
It turns out that 7km is equal to h^k^m and, therefore, is symmetrie in k 
and m. Symmetry of the other two coefficients requires the fulfilment of 
the following two identities: 
( 2 . 7 ) ! & • - ! & • 
(2.8) § £ + (h-l)^ k = f*W + (h-1) cpk i>m 
for all k and m. 
Because of (2.7) and lemma 1, there is a function F of prices such that 
for all k = 1, . . . ,K the functions <px , . . . ,<pK can be written as: 
< 2
-
9 > * - * % * • 
or, taking F(p) = log a(p) with a(p) > 0 for all p, 
/o im 31og a 1 da. (2.10) cp. = „ g — = - T — . 
k aPk a 3Pk 
Because of (2.3)" and the budget restriction (1.2) we have: 
(2.ii) 2Pk«,k = s a , g - = i, 
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hence a is homogeneous of degree 1 in prices. Inserting (2.10) into (2.8) 
and multiplying the result with a11"1 yields: 
(2.12) .>-. g £ + (h.U sh-2 ||_ ^  . J,-! | t + (h.l)ih-2 ||_ ^  
or 
(2.13) £- (a^ 4) - ^ (a^^J. 
Hence, because of lemma 1, there is a function H such that for all 
k=l, . . . ,K the functions >^k obey: 
(2.14) a^k=f-. 
For this function H the budget restriction implies: 
.h-i,/, = v „ M . (2.15) S P ka h ^ k E P k | S _ - 0, 
hence H is homogeneous of degree zero. This leads to (2.4). 
Shephard's theorem applied to (2.5) gives also (2.4). 
Remarks 
1. Note that (2.4) and (2.5) are not violated if we transform H first by 
some arbitrary differentiable function F of only one variable. Then we 
write 5H/5pk.f(H) instead of 3H/dpk where f = F', or, more explicitly, 
(2.16) ^ - -rhx ^ r f(H) 1 3H_ 3pv 
Although this does not entail more generality we shall need it in the 
next section. 
2. In fact (2.4) holds for each h e R that is unequal to 1. The cost of 
utility function is, more general, 
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(2.17) c(p,y) - a(eH + sgn s.u) 
where sgn £ = + 1 if £ > O and -1 if £ < 0. If £ > O then cü is the 
minimum level that u can attain and if e < O then eH is 'bliss-level'. 
3. Three theorems 
Theorem 1. The rank of the matrix C(p) of coefficients of the system 
(1.1) is at most 3. 
Proof. Omitting the arguments of all functions from now on and indicating 
differentiation with respect to a price p by an additional index m 
preceded by a comma, we can express the Slutsky element skm of (1.1) as 
follows 
(3.1) skm = (c k 0 m + c k l m y+...+ckN>m y*)+ 
+
 Ko + cmiy+- • •+c^ys) Ccki + 2 ^ 2 y+- • - + N c k N Z " 1 ] • 
This is a polynomial of degree 2N-1. Slutsky symmetry requires that all 
coefficients are separately symmetrie in k and m for all k,m = 1, . . . ,K. 
For the proof of theorem 1 we only need the last N-l coefficients. 
Therefore, we write skm as follows 
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N 
Skm * l ^kmr ^ + 
r = 0 
+ y N + 1 ( N c k N cm 2 + ( N - l ) c k ( N . 1 ) cm 3 + . . . + 3 c k 3 c ^ . ^ + 2 c k 2 c m N ) + 
+ yN + n "-J"1 ( N . i } ^ ^ ^ ^ c m ( n + 1 + i ) + 
i - O 
+ y 2 N - 4 ( N c k N c m ( N . 3 ) + ( N - l ) ^ ^ . , , c m ( N . 2 ) + ( N - 2 ) c k ( N . 2 ) c m ( N . 1 ) + 
( 3 . 2 ) + ( N - 3 ) c k ( N . 3 ) c m N ) ] + 
+ y 2 H - 3 ( N c k N c m ( N . 2 ) + ( N - l ) ^ ^ . , , c ^ j , . ^ + ( N - 2 ) c k ( N . 2 ) cmN] + 
+ y 2 H - 2 ( N c k N c r a ( N . n + ( N - l ) c k ( N . 1 ) cmN) + 
+ y 2 N _ 1 N c k N c m N • 
The coefficients of y2N_1 are always symmetrie. Symmetry of the 
coefficients of y2N~2 requires 
(3.3) Ne. „ e ,„ ... + (N-l)c. ,„ ., c„ = Nc„ c, ,„ -, + (N-l)c ... ,. e. „ , 
x
 ' KN m(N- 1) x ' kCN-l) mN mN k(N-l) x ' m(N-1) kN' 
or 
(3.4) ckN c ^ ^ ^ = cmN ck(N_1). 
This identity implies that we always must have, for all k=l,...,K, 
(3.5) ^(N-l) = a(N-l )HCkN ' 
where a(N_1)N is a function of prices that is independent of k. 
The coëfficiënt of y2H"3 of (3.2) consists of three terms of which the 
middle one is symmetrie; hence the sum of the other two terms has to be 
symmetrie which leads to the requirement ckN cm(H_2. = c m N cw N- 2) > o r 
(3.6) Ck(N-2) ™ a(N-2)NCkN' 
for all k=l,...,K with a(fj-2)N another function of prices that is 
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independent of k. Inserting (3.5) and (3.6) into the coefficients of y2N~ 
4
 leads to the conclusion that only the first and the last term of these 
coefficients are non-symmetrie. This leads to a ratio between the ck(N_3) 
and Cj.N that is a function a(N_3)N of prices independent of k. Continuing 
this process of substitution until the term with yN+1 leads to 
(3.7) f - = anN 
f or all k=l, . . . , K and all n > 2. 
Altematively written, we have for all n=2, . . . ,N-1 
"
CIN" 
• i 
""-Kil CKN 
which shows that all columms of the matrix C(p) except the first two are 
dependent upon he last one. This means that each row k of C(p) is 
determined after ckN, ck0, ckl and anN have been chosen, i.e. C(p) has a 
rank that is at most 3. 
Theorem 2. The most general form of a utility consistent demand system 
that is a polynomial in income without a constant term is 
(3.9)
 %{v,y^l^-y + \ ^ ^ - ^ m r , 
where a is homogeneous of degree 1 in prices, H of degree 0, and where 
the fn(n-2,...,N) are arbitrary functions of H; in addition, all these 
functions have to be such that the second-order conditon of negative 
semi-definiteness of the Slutsky matrix is fulfilled. 
Proof: Because of theorem 1 we can write cfcn = anNckN fbr k=2 N-l; 
hence (1,1) with ck0 = 0 becomes 
(3.10) qk(p,y) = ckl y + a2N ckN y2+ a3N ckN y3 + . . .+a( N. x) NckKyN" x + 
(3.8) 
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(If all functions a n N are zero (3.10) coincides with (2.3) and according 
to lemma 2 also with the special case of (3.9) with f (H)=0 for 
n=2,...,N-l, provided the cfcl and the c k N are: 
<3-n> ^ i - i l f c 
and 
(3.12) ckN - p l r § | - f, (H), 
for all k—1 K, where a (non-zero) and H are functions of prices, 
homogeneous of degree 1 and 0 respectively and fN is an arbitrary 
function of only one argument with FN as a primitive function; see remark 
1 after lemma 2. So (3.9) cannot hold in general unless (3.11) and (3.12) 
can be satisfied. We will now show that, if this is the case, the values 
of a;nN must satisfy 
for n-2,...,N-1, or, in view of (3.12) 
(3 14) a - aN_n f"(H) O.J.1J anN a fH(H)-
In elaborating the Slutsky coëfficiënt we will write an instead of c*nN 
from now on. As from (3.7) c. s3c. „/3p =3 (a c. „)/3p =a c. „ + a c. „ 
x
 ' K n , m k n ' r m x n K B " r m n k N , m n , m kN 
we may w r i t e : 
N N N 
s. cm " l C k n , / + l C m n y n l n C kn ? " ' ' 
n=1 n - 1 n=1 
: l , » y + 0*2CkN,m + «2 , m C k N ) y 2 + - - - + 
+ C Q N - 1 C k N , m + a N - l , m C k J ^ ^ + ^ N , / + (^J + «2 C m N y 2 + • • • + 
c k  
+
 "v-i^y"'1 + c^ys)-
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• O k i + 2 < * 2 c * N y + - - - + ( N - 1 ) a N - i c k N y N ~ 2 + N c k N y N " 1 3 -
- yC C k l ,m + C k l C mJ + 
(3 .15) + y 2 [ a 2 c k N m + a 2 m ckN + 2a2 ckN c m l + a2 cmN c k J + 
+
 y 3 ( a 3 C k N , m + a 3 , m C kN + 3 a 3 C kN Cm 1 + 2 ( « 2 > 2 C kN CmN + a 3 CmN C k J + 
i x - 2 
ï 
i - 1 
+
 ^ ^ n ^ N . m + " n , m C kN + n a n C kN Cm 1 + l_ C 1 1 " 1 ) « n - i a i
 + l ) C k N CmN + 
+
 "n CmN Ck J + 
N - 2 
+
 ^ ( C k N , m + N c K N C m l + l ( N - i ) ^ ^ < * . + 1 ) c k N C m N 
i - 1 
2 N - 1 
+ C m N C k J + ï ^kmr ?* • 
r = N + l 
Note that for all k,m and r—N+l, . . . .2N-1 we have a, =a , because of 
' kmr mk r 
theorem 1, hence we now only need to establish the symmetry of the first 
N terms, because the last N-l are already symmetrie. The first term of 
the last member, that with y, is symmetrie in k and m because of (3.11). 
It can easily be seen that the terms with y11 for n=2,...,N-l are 
symmetrie if and only if for all these values of n 
(3.16) a e. „
 m + a c.„ + na c. „ cm1 + a c „ c. . -
x /
 n k N , m n , m kN n kN ml n mN kl 
= a e „ , + a , c „ + na c „ c, , + a c, „ e , . 
n mN , k n,k mN n mN kl n kN ml 
Rearranging this and using (3.11) gives 
n
 17) d ( a n c vn> + S l l -È±- , ) _ 3(a ncm N ) n 4 3a_ 
{ n
 a P m
 +
 a aPm
 ( a n c ^ } aPk
 +
 a aPk ^ « W -
Multiplying this with a11-1 we see that (3.17) implies: 
(3 18) fl(aB-X^) = ^' 8'\^i) 
5Pm 3Pk 
This means, according to lemma 1, that there are some functions Gn of 
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prices such that for -all k—1, . . . ,K and n—2, . . . ,'N-l: 
(3.19) a - 1 * ^ , -§§•• . 
Gombining this with (3.12) gives 
ex 9n^
 an-i„ J-_ dF„ (H) - dGn 
" a" 3pk 3pk 
Hence for all n=2,...,N-1 we have 
3FH(H) 9FN(H) 3FN(H) 
(3 21) 3Pi 9P? = « _ Ê 2 K 
ao^ ac^ ••• ac^ 
apx ap2 3pK 
Gonsequently, FN(H) and Gn are functionally dependent, i.e there are 
functions $ and $ such that n n 
(3.22) Gn=$n(Fn(H)) - *n(H); ' 
see, e.g. Burkill an Burkill (1970). Let ^n be the derivative of * with 
respect to H. Relations (3.20) then become 
(3.23) - ^ f N ( H ) | | - ^ n ( H ) | - , 
for all k-1,...,K. Hence 
(3.24) an=aN-nfn(H)/fN(H) 
with fa(H)= Vn(H). 
This proves the theorem. 
The general case (1.1), with a constant term, can now easily be treated. 
Because every polynomial in y can also be written as a polynomial in y-z, 
where z is arbitrary, we can prove: 
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Theorem 3. The most general form of a utility consistent demand system 
whose equations are polynomials in income y is 
<*•»> * - 1 : • ï ft *-'>•.!, d ^^.w-»--
where a and 9 are linear-homogeneous functions of prices, H is a zero 
homogenous function of prices and the fn are functions of only one 
argument; all these functions have to be such that the matrix of Slutsky 
elements is negative semi-definite. 
Proof 
As (3.25) appears to satisfy additivity, homogeneity and the 
integrability conditions it is PUM. In order to prove the necessity of 
(3.25) consider the system 
(3.26) qk - Vk + l ckn (y-er, 
n-l 
where k = 1,...,K, with Tpk , cfcn and 9 functions of p only. First, we 
shall show that for (3.26) being PUM it is necesary that 9 is linear-
homogeneous in p. Then we apply theorem 2 to show that the c. have to 
have the forms found in (3.25) and, subsequently, we show that each & 
has to be the derivative of 9 with respect to pk. 
Applying Euler's theorem on homogeneous functions to (3.26) yields the 
following identity in p and y: 
y p A. + y t p cv (y-0)n+ 
K K N 
l Pm A.m  ï l 
m=1 m=1 n=1 
(3.27) 
-l Pm f f l n c k n ( y - J r ' + y l n c , , ( y - ö ) n - i = 0 , 
m«l "m n=l n = l 
where, again, differentiation of the ^ k and the ckn with respect to pm is 
indicated by an index m preceded by a comma. The left-hand side of (3.27) 
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can be considered as a polynomial in y of degree N. The identity can, 
therefore, only be fulfilled if all coefficients of this polynomial are 
zero. The coëfficiënt of yN is equal to 
(3.28) lVm c k N m +Nc k N - 0. 
m 
T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t c k N i s homogeneous of d e g r e e -N and , b e c a u s e cfcN may be 
i d e n t i c a l l y z e r o , c w N - i % m u s t t>e homogeneous of d e g r e e - ( N - l ) and so on. 
About t h e c o ë f f i c i ë n t of y " " 1 we can s t a t e : 
( 3 . 2 9 ) -W8 l pm c k N m - N c k N l pm f £ - - N(N- l ) 0c k N + £ P m c k ( N _ 1 ) m + 
+ ( N - l ) c k ( N . n - 0 . 
Due t o t h e h o m o g e n e i t y of c k N and ck ,ï[.1-> t h i s i s e q u i v a l e n t t o 
( 3 . 3 0 ) -Nc k N l K | | - + N * c k N = 0 , 3p 
o r 
<3-31> ^ f f 
ra r m 
Hence 8 is homogeneous of degree 1 in p. 
As (3.26) is also PUM for 0=0 and all ^=0 (identically) we infer from 
theorem 2 that 
<3-32> C - = ï l t 
and, for n=2,...,N, 
(3.33) ckn - ^  fjL fn (H) . 
To prove that ^k= 50/3pk we need Slutsky symmetry. The Slutsky element 
skm for (3.26) obeys 
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(3.34) sv = f3*- + q l3^ - A. + 7 cv (y-0)n + ^ 7 km gn Hm g-y rk , m " kn,m ^ ' 
f f Enc k n(y- Ö )— + 
^m n 
+
 W« + l cnil(y-0B} Inckn(y-ö) n-l 
s. + A, + (# " f^~) I nc. (y-0)n_1 
*ra n 
Note that skm equals the second member of (3.15) with y replaced by (y-
6). Because of theorem 2 we must have ?km-smk . Hence the remainder of 
(3.34) must also be symmetrie in k and m. This remainder is a polynomial 
in y of degree N-l, hence all its coefficients have to be symmetrie. For 
the coëfficiënt of ys"1 this means for all k and m — 1,...,K: 
<3-35> 0 m " sT-J T^T gr- fN(H) = 0 k " a^ -J pr-T aTT f„ (H) 
where we substituted for ckN the form that it must have according to 
(3.33). From this we get 
,, ,,. f, BB -, 3E r de i 5H 
<3-36> Om * ^ rJ 7ZT = Ok " ^T-J 3pmJ apv ^k ap.^ aP k "He 
This identitiy has to hold for any function H that is homogeneous of 
degree zero. This is only possible if for all m = 1,...,K 
<3-3 7> * . - ! £ - • 
This proves the theorem. 
4. Goncluding remarks 
According to Weierstrasz' theorem every function can be approximated 
uniformly close by a polynomial. The advantage of the polynomial choice 
is that it satisfies the theorem of Nataf on aggregation. Above we have 
derived the constraints that should be imposed upon a polynomial demand 
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function if it must satisfy the requirements of utility maximization. The 
polynomials are not the only functions that satisfy Nataf. The functions 
of the Nataf class are of the form; see van Daal and Merkies [1984, 
p.33]. 
( 4 . 1 ) 
*dk 
h j k E <Pkm <Xjkm>] 
where j refers to the individual, k to the commodity and m to the kind of 
input, whereas h.k is an arbitrary monotonie function of one variable. A 
subclass of (4.1) is the Gorman class, where h.k is the identity 
function, which may result after transformations h"1k(q.k) of the 
outputs. From this Gorman [1981] derived the integrable class as the 
class of functions that are generated by utility maximization and 
therefore restricted to be integrable. Gorman also presented all possible 
specifications of these integrable functions, see Gorman (1981, p.16). If 
homogeneity is also adopted, some of these functions drop out, see 
Merkies and Van Daal [1987]. The relation between the various 
possibilities is clarified in scheme 1 below. 
I I i 
Nataf | Gorman <J poly | PUM 
Class -{ class | nomials I 
L 
L 
Gormans 
- Integrable 
Class 
approximated 
by 
3 
SCHEME 1 
From the scheme the following relations appear: 
Set of all functions 
Nataf's class 
Gorman's class 
Polynomial class 
A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H 
A+B+C+D+E+F+G 
A+B+C+D+E+F 
A+B+C+D 
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PUM : C+D 
Gorman's integrable class : C+D+E 
Weierstrasz-class : A+B+C+D 
Weierstrasz-Gorman sub-class: B+G 
Heineke and Shefrin class : B 
We have conjectured that the inverse of Weierstrasz' theorem ('any 
polynomial can act as an approximation of some non-polynomial') is true. 
If this is not the case-we must split set A into two subsets one having 
and one missing this property and the latter is then not contained in the 
Weierstrasz' class. The Weierstrasz-Gorman sub-class is obtained after 
approximating each member of class E by a polynomial. 
It should be stressed that we have imposed integrability requirements 
upon our functions after we have selected a polynomial. Hence the PUM 
class is a subset of the polynomial class, but as this in its turn is a 
subset of Gorman's class, the PUM is also a subset of Gorman's integrable 
class. We could also. have started from the latter and derive from this 
with reference to Weierstrasz theorem the polynomial class B + C + D. 
Heineke and Shefrin (1986) show why we cannot guarantee to find an 
integrable member of the polynomial class that is sufficiently close to 
our demand function. In other words they show that the class, indicated 
by (B) is not necessarily empty. So if our PUM demand is only an 
approximated polynomial it may happen that it is not sufficiently close 
to our actual demand function. Therefore to complete the set of demand 
functions that are based upon utility maximization, we need to look for 
class B arising from non polynomial members of Gorman's integrable class, 
that -if approximated by a polynomial- end up in Heineke and 
Shefrins'class. 
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